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TORT LAW AND CIVIL RECOURSE
Mark A . Geistfeld*
RECOGNIZING WRONGS. By John C .P . Goldberg and Benjamin C .
Zipursky. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press. 2020. Pp. 380. $45.
INTRODUCTION
For decades, Professors John Goldberg 1 and Benjamin Zipursky 2 have
been developing the thesis that the primary purpose of tort law is to implement the principle of civil recourse. 3 In Recognizing Wrongs, they “aim” to
provide “a systematic statement” of this position (p. 52).
As they forthrightly recognize, civil recourse embodies “an apparently
obvious truth about its subject” (p. 83). Tort law is a civilized form of dispute
resolution that uses liability to redress a defendant’s violation of the plaintiff’s tort right, with redress typically taking the form of compensatory damages for the harm caused by the wrongdoing. Tort liability, therefore,
patently satisfies “the principle of civil recourse,” which “can be summarized
as follows: A person who is the victim of a legal wrong is entitled to an avenue of civil recourse against one who wrongs her” (p. 3).
To provide an adequate account of tort law, the principle of civil recourse cannot simply describe the formal structure of tort liability; it must
also explain the substantive nature of wrongdoing and identify the reasons
why the legal system redresses the violation of the associated rights through
the tort system. In taking up this challenge, Goldberg and Zipursky emphasize how civil recourse relies upon common-law processes and empowers
victims to seek redress through the legal system and not through self-help.
Civil recourse, they conclude, is a “[c]onstitutional [p]rinciple” (p. 30). Consequently, tort law “is a readily justifiable feature of a liberal-democratic re-

* Sheila Lubetsky Birnbaum Professor of Civil Litigation, New York University School
of Law. I’m grateful to Yochai Benkler and Bob Rabin for their helpful comments. Financial
support was provided by the Filomen D’Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund of the
New York University School of Law.
1. Carter Professor of General Jurisprudence and Deputy Dean, Harvard Law School.
2. James H. Quinn ’49 Chair in Legal Ethics, Fordham University School of Law.
3. For some of the earlier works in which Professors Goldberg and Zipursky develop
the principle of civil recourse, see Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the
Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1998); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective
Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695 (2003); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs,
88 TEX. L. REV. 917 (2010); and John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse
Revisited, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 341 (2011).
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gime, akin in many respects to law that provides individuals with the right
and the power to vote” (p. 341).
These wide-ranging claims—along with a host of other interesting ideas—are insightfully developed in the book, but one can reject many of them
while still finding that Goldberg and Zipursky have developed the principle
of civil recourse in a manner that helpfully illuminates the substantive nature
of tort law. Most of the book strives to provide such an account, successfully
tying the principle of civil recourse to a particular conception of tort law
wholly defined by conduct-based duties of noninjury, the breach of which
necessarily involves prohibited behavior. By engaging in such prohibited behavior, the defendant mistreated the plaintiff, even if the defendant’s conduct was entirely blameless. Tort law accordingly gives victims a right to
redress from those who have mistreated them, leading Goldberg and
Zipursky to conclude that “the point of tort law is to define and prohibit certain forms of mistreatment, and to provide victims of such mistreatment
with the ability to use civil litigation to obtain redress from those who have
mistreated them” (p. 266).
This conception of tort law is highly contestable. As this Review shows,
civil recourse readily accommodates an alternative interpretation of tort law
that substantially limits the relevance of mistreatment, which in turn limits
the importance of civil recourse to the remedial aspects of modern tort law.
Although undoubtedly important, the redressive structure of tort liability
does not supply the “point of tort law.”
Goldberg and Zipursky depict tort law in a manner that is faithful to its
historical origins but is now anachronistic. The role of mistreatment within
the early common law stems from the customary norms that governed behavior in the state of nature. Lacking protection of centralized government,
individuals needed to defend their honor in order to ward off future attacks.
Suffering injury at the hands of another necessarily involved a form of mistreatment that entitled the victim to obtain redress from the injurer. By enforcing these norms, the early common law was fully animated by the
principle of civil recourse. 4
Over time, social conditions have changed. Physical security no longer
depends on one’s honor. To protect individuals from physical harm, modern
tort law focuses on the prevention and compensation of injury. 5 Mistreatment matters only insofar as it involves highly culpable wrongdoing—a distinctive threat to physical security redressed by punitive damages. Outside of
this extraordinary remedy, mistreatment is not relevant to tort liability in
cases of accidental physical harm. Tort liability still formally satisfies the
principle of civil recourse—plaintiffs receive redress from defendants who
violated their tort rights and thereby wronged them—but the primary purpose of modern tort law is defined by its substantive rights and correlative
obligations, not by the remedial structure of civil recourse.
4 .
5 .

See infra Section II.A.
See infra Section II.B.
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Nevertheless, the principle of civil recourse sharpens our understanding
of how tort law responds to the mistreatment of one individual by another.
This aspect of tort liability has been masked by the long-running debates
over tort reform and the like. By focusing on the structural features of tort
liability, Goldberg and Zipursky identify valuable attributes of the tort system within a liberal democracy, an important contribution that has shaped
and will continue to influence how we think about tort law.
I.

A RIGHT IMPLIES A REMEDY

[I]t is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is
also a legal remedy, by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded .
—William Blackstone 6
The rule identified by Blackstone, embodied in the maxim ubi jus ibi
remedium, captures the core meaning of civil recourse according to Goldberg and Zipursky because it “expresses our legal system’s commitment” to
that “important substantive principle” (p. 15). The logic behind this conclusion drives their interpretation of tort law.
Tort law is largely state law in the United States. As Judge Thomas Phillips has helpfully catalogued, the “most widespread and important” of the
individual rights contained in state constitutions “is probably the guarantee
of a right of access to the courts to obtain a remedy for injury. It is one of the
oldest of Anglo-American rights, rooted in Magna Carta and nourished in
the English struggle for individual liberty and conscience rights.” 7 This right
“expressly or implicitly appears in forty state constitutions.” 8 The ubi jus
maxim is firmly entrenched within our legal culture in many other ways that
Goldberg and Zipursky identify, beginning with the Declaration of Independence (pp. 35–36).
The meaning of the ubi jus maxim is contestable, however, as illustrated
by the range of interpretations that state courts have given to the right when
deciding whether legislative limitations of tort liability are constitutional. 9 Of
the state constitutions that recognize the right, twenty-seven require that an
individual “shall” have a remedy for “injury done him in his person” or
“property,” with another eleven pronouncing that individuals “ought” to
have such a remedy. 10 Regardless of the exact formulation, these provisions
all expressly declare that an injury creates a right to a remedy, which is one
way of formulating the ubi jus maxim: an individual has a right not to be in6. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23 (footnote omitted).
7. Thomas R. Phillips, The Constitutional Right to a Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309,
1310 (2003) (footnote omitted).
8 . Id .
9 . See id . at 1311–14 (discussing this case law and concluding that it reaches “disparate
results” that “are essentially inexplicable”).
10 . Id . at 1311 (discussing two major variants of these provisions).
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jured by another, and so the occurrence of injury entitles him to a remedy
from the wrongdoer. This formulation of the maxim is literally satisfied by a
rule of strict liability that entitles one to the remedy of monetary damages for
“injury done him” by another, 11 but no state court has concluded that strict
liability is constitutionally required in all cases of injury. The substantive implications of the right to a remedy are unclear.
For reasons further illustrated by strict liability, the substantive importance of the ubi jus maxim is also unclear. Strict liability entitles the
right-holder to receive compensatory damages from a duty-bearer who
caused her injury, turning the ubi jus maxim into a tautology—the right is
nothing other than an entitlement to the compensatory damages remedy, so
there can be no such right if it has no remedy. Strict liability straightforwardly satisfies the ubi jus maxim while rendering it substantively unimportant:
all the interesting action resides in the reasons that justify the compensatory
liability rule, not in the abstract right to a remedy.
According to Goldberg and Zipursky, tort rules do not have this property. Relying on doctrinal analysis, they conclude that tort rules obligate dutybearers to avoid specified behaviors that cause injury to right-holders, thereby instantiating the “conduct-rule theory of legal rights” (p. 97). One who
acts in a manner prohibited by a duty of noninjury mistreats the rightholder, who is then empowered to seek interpersonal redress for the wrongdoing through the courts (pp. 162–63). Consequently, “[a] tort is a violation
of a relational legal directive enjoining one person from mistreating another
in a certain manner” (p. 181). A tort right, on their account, is not just an entitlement to compensatory damages; it also prohibits the duty-bearer from
acting in certain ways that cause injury—the mistreatment that merits redress through the tort system.
For this type of tort system, civil recourse is especially valuable because
it provides an interpersonal remedy for instances in which one person has
mistreated another, explaining why Goldberg and Zipursky insist that tort
rules enjoin specified forms of injury-causing behavior. Absent such prohibition, wrongdoing lacks the element of mistreatment that motivates their account of civil recourse.
No other theory of tort law places such a fundamental emphasis on mistreatment, which is both a strength and a weakness. The framework is original and shows that a persuasive interpretation of tort law ought to account
for interpersonal relations of mistreatment. The importance of this behavior,
however, depends on how it is defined. Goldberg and Zipursky conceptualize mistreatment in a way that begs important questions, considerably weakening their claims about the significance of civil recourse.
The problem, not surprisingly, arises from the various tort rules that
function as forms of strict liability, including those not expressly denominated as such. A good example is provided by the objective standard of reasonable care that requires individuals to make safety decisions based on
11 .

Id .
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ordinary knowledge and intelligence, even if they don’t have that wisdom or
the associated mental capabilities. 12 Goldberg and Zipursky recognize that
these objectively defined behavioral obligations can be quite “unforgiving”
and thereby subject “blameless” defendants to liability (p. 197). Nevertheless,
they assert that the defendant in these cases engaged in a form of conduct
prohibited by the plaintiff’s tort right and “thus mistreated the plaintiff in a
manner that counts as a legal rights-violation” (p. 196; emphasis omitted).
By defining the forms of no-fault liability so that they are “almost always
strict in the unforgiving sense” (p. 192), Goldberg and Zipursky bear the
burden of explaining how and why courts decide to adopt an “unforgiving”
standard for some types of behavior and not others. Though they provide
rationales for the practice in general (pp. 197–98), they do not demonstrate
that courts have adopted “unforgiving” standards in a consistent or defensible manner across cases.
In any event, without an adequate anchor in behavioral reality, the mistreatment of a plaintiff by a defendant who engaged in prohibited behavior is
only definitional wordplay. If a defendant does not have the mental or physical capacity to behave in the manner required by an “unforgiving” tort duty,
in what substantive respect does such behavior mistreat the plaintiff?
The prohibition that purportedly attaches to this behavior is also problematic. According to Goldberg and Zipursky, behavior is prohibited only if
it proximately causes injury to a right-holder—the duty is one of noninjury
(pp. 186–87). But a defendant who engages in risky behavior does not know
whether her conduct will accidentally injure the plaintiff. Unable to guarantee compliance with the “unforgiving” behavioral obligation in the first instance, the defendant had only one choice to ensure that she would not be
acting in a prohibited manner—avoid engaging in the risky activity altogether. Insofar as one should not act in a legally prohibited manner, the duty
posited by Goldberg and Zipursky implies that those who cannot always
comply with an “unforgiving” behavioral obligation should not engage in the
risky activity—an extreme obligation that would prevent most of us from
driving automobiles. 13
Rather than shoehorn these cases into the category of “prohibit[ed] . . . forms of mistreatment” (p. 266), an alternative interpretation recognizes that blameless defendants incur a purely compensatory form of no-

12 . See, e .g ., Burch v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 543 N.W.2d 277, 280–81 (Wis. 1996) (applying the objective standard of reasonable care to a fifteen-year-old girl diagnosed with cerebral palsy and found to have the “mental and cognitive capacity . . . of a normal child between
ages three and six”).
13 . See Carrie Huisingh, Russell Griffin & Gerald McGwin Jr., The Prevalence of Distraction Among Passenger Vehicle Drivers: A Roadside Observational Approach, 16 TRAFFIC INJ.
PREVENTION 140, 141, 144 (2015) (summarizing various empirical studies finding that drivers
engaged in distracting activities anywhere from 31 to 44 percent of the total time the vehicle
was moving, and providing results from a roadside observational study of passing vehicles
which found that at that point in time, “one third of drivers were engaged in one or more distracting activities while driving”).
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fault or strict liability. Consider the rule of strict liability for abnormally
dangerous activities, 14 which originated in the famous case Rylands v . Fletcher. 15 This rule does not prohibit duty-bearers from engaging in abnormally
dangerous activities like blasting; it only obligates them to pay compensation
for the associated injuries. 16 The rule cannot be plausibly interpreted in
terms of an “unforgiving” behavioral standard, as Goldberg and Zipursky
recognize (p. 191). Because it lacks any behavioral obligation not to injure
right-holders in the first instance, this purely compensatory form of strict
liability does not involve the type of prohibited mistreatment required by
Goldberg and Zipursky.
After admitting that this form of liability challenges their interpretation
of tort law, Goldberg and Zipursky sidestep the problem: “Rylands is recognized as an exceptional case. True, it is a staple of Torts courses. But that is
precisely because the terms on which it imposes liability are so distinctive as
to locate it at or beyond tort law’s conceptual boundaries” (p. 191). Having
denied that a purely compensatory form of strict liability is properly characterized as a rule of tort law, Goldberg and Zipursky define tort liability so
that it always involves prohibited mistreatment—the failure to comply with
an obligatory, often unrealistic “unforgiving” behavioral standard not to
cause injury.
Their argument thus far only provides a theory of tort liability. It omits
the contours of tort law—the specification of rights, the violation of which
constitutes the wrongs subject to tort liability. “[T]he civil recourse principle
does not itself provide an account of tort law’s wrongs (although it does limit
the range of possible accounts)” (p. 230). Goldberg and Zipursky accordingly
recognize that “[a] theory of torts must not only constrain the possible ways
of fleshing out tort law’s wrongs, but also must capture and help guide judicial reasoning about what shall count as wrongs” (p. 231).
Goldberg and Zipursky propose a theory of “dual constructivism” as a
“fresh attempt to theorize tort law’s wrongs” (pp. 232–33). Unlike the instrumental approach that interprets tort law by straining to conjoin the functions of compensation and deterrence in furtherance of some objective like
allocative efficiency, dual constructivism directly integrates the two properties by “elucidating the norms of tort law, rather than in positing or enacting
them” (pp. 238–39).
Rather than representing a new framework, dual constructivism is an elegant restatement of substantively sound analogical reasoning, the character-

14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519–520 (AM. L. INST. 1977).
15. Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) 3 LRE & I. App. 330 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.).
16 . See, e .g ., Spano v. Perini Corp., 250 N.E.2d 31, 34–35 (N.Y. 1969) (observing that the
question in these cases is “not whether it was lawful or proper to engage” in the activity but
“who should bear the cost of any resulting damage—the person who engaged in the dangerous
activity or the innocent neighbor injured thereby”).
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istic form of common-law analysis. 17 Reasoning by analogy, courts have developed the modern law of torts from its origins in the medieval writ of trespass, which subsequently spawned the writ of trespass on the case:
[A]s did medieval judges when they expanded the menu of actionable injurious wrongs via the writ of trespass on the case, modern common-law
courts are in significant part elucidating and expanding upon norms of
conduct that are already in tort law, . . . and thereby recognizing duties and
rights that had not been clearly recognized before. (p. 240)

At times, judges “must make what is inevitably a loaded judgment about
whether the social norm being imported into the law actually does fit the
precedential common-law framework that it supposedly exemplifies”
(p. 253). But this reasoning is neither policymaking writ large nor “ ‘naked’
moralizing” about the common law of torts:
Inchoate norms of conduct and inchoate expectations are, so to speak, elevated to legal status (or not) through common-law adjudication. To the extent that these norms of conduct already exist in social mores and in indiindividuals’ expectations and dispositions, common-law courts are not
making them up out of whole cloth. On the other hand, it is the nature of
common-law reasoning that judges possess the power to say whether such
norms exist, to call upon them as extant norms and expectations, and then
to decide whether to entrench them in an institutional system that generates significant practical consequences. (p. 252)

As Goldberg and Zipursky subsequently observe in a telling passage,
“[t]o the extent we have been laconic about substance, it is perhaps because
this aspect of tort law is arguably its least mysterious feature” (p. 266). Their
theory, however, leaves it mysterious as to how judges who engage in common-law reasoning derive the substantive obligations of tort law by selectively enforcing “prevailing norms” of social behavior (p. 114).
Tort law does not enforce all social norms because some customs (like
jaywalking in New York City) are not reasonably safe. 18 What, then, is the
more abstract normative source of tort law that courts draw upon to determine whether a particular social norm should be “elevated to legal status (or
not) through common-law adjudication”? What justifies the “unforgiving”
behavioral demands that effectively function as forms of no-fault or strict
17 . See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 741 (1993) (explaining that analogical reasoning is not based on a priori first principles,
but can nevertheless coherently develop the law, because analogies depend on placing a case
within its proper category and over time courts can develop increasingly general principles for
categorizing cases); GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 13 (1982)
(“The most powerful engine of change in the common law was, strangely enough, the great
‘principle’ that like cases should be treated alike. Courts acting on that principle could change
law, indeed make law, without arrogating to themselves undue power because they always
seemed to apply past precedents or principles in new ways to situations made new by the world
around them.”).
18 . See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 13(a) (AM. L. INST. 2010).
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liability? Because compliance with an “unforgiving” standard of conduct
does not have to be behaviorally realistic, what prevents courts from adopting the “unforgiving” standard “never harm another,” thereby placing purely
compensatory forms of strict liability within the domain of tort law? After
all, if someone injures another and does not provide compensation, why isn’t
the failure to do so a form of mistreatment properly governed by the principle of civil recourse?
The principle of civil recourse does not have the resources to answer
these questions, because it only “informs but does not determine the content
of tort law” (p. 234). A right may imply a remedy, but the remedies that satisfy the principle of civil recourse do not entail a unique set of tort rights.
II.

COMPENSATION, MISTREATMENT, AND CONDUCT-BASED WRONGS

“Thou shalt do no hurt to thy neighbor .” Our law of torts, with all its irregularities, has for its main purpose nothing else than the development of this precept .
—Sir Frederick Pollock 19
In developing the precept that one “shalt do no hurt to thy neighbor,”
tort law does not have to prohibit individuals from injuring others, an impossible demand across the full range of social interactions. A behaviorally
realistic formulation of the precept simply requires individuals to compensate others they have accidentally injured by their affirmative acts, in which
case they have not “hurt” their neighbor.
To be sure, the term “injury” was employed by early legal scholars to refer to “a completed wrong that has been committed by one person against
another.” 20 One completes a wrong by violating another’s right, and a tort
right can be formulated in various ways that do not necessitate a rule of strict
liability requiring injury compensation in all cases. 21 Pollock, however, was
not describing specific rights and their correlative duties, which are governed
by the different “precept” to “render every man his due” as a matter of his
particular right and your corresponding obligation. 22 By referencing a distinct “precept” not to “hurt” another, Pollock apparently recognized a distinct normative obligation to compensate those you have harmed.
A compensatory norm is not limited to the redress of prohibited forms
of mistreatment. One can incur the compensatory obligation based on the

19. FREDERICK POLLOCK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 13 (James Avery Webb
ed., St. Louis, F.H. Thomas L. Book Co. 1894) (1887) (footnote omitted).
20. John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages: Fair v . Full Compensation,
55 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 437 (2006).
21. For this same reason, the state constitutional right to a remedy for “injury” does not
necessarily entail a rule of strict liability. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text.
22. POLLOCK, supra note 19, at 12 n. (“Honeste vivere (to live honorably), alterum non
laedere (not to injure others), and suum cuique tribuere (to render to every man his due), were
the three general precepts to which Justinian reduced the whole doctrine of the law.”).
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fact of hurting or harming another—the type of obligation embodied in a
compensatory rule of strict liability that is not formulated in terms of an
“unforgiving” behavioral standard not to cause injury in the first instance.
According to Goldberg and Zipursky, “if strict tort liability routinely
took the form of licensing-based liability, there would indeed be grounds for
rejecting our contention that torts are wrongs” (p. 191). Unless one violates a
behavioral prohibition not to injure another in a specified way, there is no
mistreatment justifiably redressed by tort liability, or so they maintain.
A compensatory tort obligation, however, satisfies the structural requirements of civil recourse. These requirements, according to Goldberg and
Zipursky, involve legal “redress for injury-inclusive, relational legal wrongs”
(p. 116). A compensatory duty and its correlative compensatory right are relational, the duty is breached and the right violated only in cases of injury,
and tort liability requires the defendant to compensate the plaintiff as legal
redress for the wrong or failure to compensate the injury in the first instance.
Like the conduct-based, prohibitory duties of noninjury invoked by Goldberg and Zipursky, a compensatory tort obligation also satisfies the principle
of civil recourse.
The violation of this compensatory duty, moreover, is a form of mistreatment in the sense that the injurer’s failure to offer compensation violates the precept that one “shalt do no hurt to thy neighbor.” In these cases,
as Adam Smith observed, an injurer with “any sensibility . . . necessarily desires to compensate the damage,” for to “offer no atonement[] is regarded as
the highest brutality.” 23
Mistreatment can take various forms, much in the same way that “hurt”
or “injury” can have various meanings. Although the principle of civil recourse responds to instances of mistreatment, it cannot determine what constitutes mistreatment in the first place. Whether mistreatment is limited to
prohibited forms of behavior, or whether it also encompasses the failure to
compensate another’s injury, depends on the substantive properties of tort
law.
A. Mistreatment and the Early Common Law
As Goldberg and Zipursky properly emphasize, understanding the development of tort law “requires understanding how judges have applied the
common law and moved it forward by virtue of their reflective entrenchment in existing law and the social norms it embodies” (p. 234). Through the
process of common-law adjudication, courts since medieval times have been

23. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 104 (D.D. Raphael & A.L.
Macfie eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1976) (1759); see also Emily Sherwin, Interpreting Tort Law, 39
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 227, 234 (2011) (“A further difficulty for Goldberg and Zipursky is that if
resentment of a blameless injurer is defensible at all, it should be equally defensible when legal
liability is strict rather than fault-based. In either case, what triggers resentment is not the injurer’s initial conduct toward the victim (which does not invite blame), but the injurer’s failure
to suffer its consequences.”).
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invited to “build out, through a process of analogy, from the collection of
wrongs initially actionable under the writ of trespass” (p. 235; emphasis
omitted).
The first forms of the common law “simply codified existing custom”
that governed behavior in the state of nature, a term legal historians use to
connote society not subject to centralized governmental authority. 24 Unlike
the anarchic “state of nature” analyzed by social-contract theorists such as
Hobbes and Locke, social life prior to the emergence of centralized governance was ordered by norms that structured social interactions. 25 With the
transition to centralized government, the state began to enforce these norms
as the common law of England.
Following the lead of Oliver Wendell Holmes, modern tort scholars have
largely ignored these customary practices, relying on the assumption that the
norms were inherently barbaric and could not withstand the evolving demands of an increasingly civilized society. As Holmes observed, “in the main
the law started from those intentional wrongs which are the simplest and
most pronounced cases, as well as the nearest to the feeling of revenge which
leads to self-redress.” 26 In the state of nature, instances of intentional wrongdoing were governed by the retaliatory norm commonly paraphrased as “an
eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.” For Holmes and the ensuing generations
of tort scholars, the retaliatory norm’s relevance for the modern legal system
is limited to issues concerning the amount of punishment to be meted out by
the criminal justice system, making it irrelevant for tort law. 27
Goldberg and Zipursky also focus on the early forms of liability involving intentional harms, but unlike Holmes and others, they claim these forms
of liability have ongoing relevance for the modern tort system. These original wrongs “were selected because of their widespread recognition as serious
forms of mistreatment” (p. 234). Modern tort law then evolved from these
“basic forms of injurious wrongdoing—batteries, false imprisonments, and
trespasses to property—[that] probably formed the bulk of English tort law
circa 1300” (p. 234). Mistreatment has always been integral to tort liability,
they argue, leading them to conclude that the primary purpose of tort law is
to provide redress for prohibited mistreatment.
Although Goldberg and Zipursky are undeniably correct that the original wrongs of battery and the like involve “serious forms of mistreatment,”
they do not otherwise discuss the customary norms of behavior that first
shaped the early common law. In this respect, they follow the convention of
24. James Q. Whitman, At the Origins of Law and the State: Supervision of Violence, Mutilation of Bodies, or Setting of Prices?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 41, 53 (1995).
25 . Id . at 41–42.
26. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 146 (Harvard Univ. Press 2009)
(1881).
27 . See Mark A. Geistfeld, Hidden in Plain Sight: The Normative Source of Modern Tort
Law, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1517, 1526–27 (2016) (providing more detailed description of the conventional understanding of the norms first enforced by the common law). The ensuing discussion in this Part is largely drawn from this article.
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modern torts scholarship, a limitation of their approach that I have previously identified within the corpus of their work that they have now refined
into Recognizing Wrongs. 28 To understand how the early common-law rules
governing batteries, false imprisonments, and trespasses have shaped the development of modern tort law, we must first identify the social norms that
the early common law enforced with the original writ of trespass.
Customary social practices in the state of nature were based on “the
principle of reciprocity” that “pervade[d] every relation of primitive life and
is exemplified in many other ways.” 29 This moral code, according to William
Miller, was based on the “notion . . . that justice is a matter of restoring balance, achieving equity, determining equivalence, making reparations, paying
debts, taking revenge—all matters of getting back to zero, to even.” 30
In cases of intentional wrongdoing, the reciprocity norm attained equitable balance by entitling the victim to respond with reciprocal aggression—
the “eye for an eye.” In a world without centralized governmental authority,
individuals had to protect themselves with self-help remedies. By responding
with reciprocal aggression, the victim restored his moral balance with the attacker and deterred future acts of aggression by sending the message that assaults of this sort will be responded to in kind. Redress for mistreatment
characterized this normative practice for reasons that are hardly barbaric.
The norm of reciprocity, however, was not limited to revenge. Relying
on an extensive body of evidence, Miller concluded that “[r]evenge always
coexisted with a compensation option” in the state of nature. 31 The reasons,
as Holmes recognized, are obvious: “even a dog distinguishes between being
stumbled over and being kicked.” 32 Or as another historian put it, “Is it surprising that the notion of having to give back what you have unlawfully taken away (compensation) should have arisen as early as the notion of hitting
again if you have been hit (punishment)?” 33
The normative logic of compensation, though, is not limited to the return of stolen property. An injurer can “take” the eye of a victim by causing
him to “lose” his sight. In the event of an accident, however, the injurer did
not take the victim’s eyesight in an act of aggression—the loss was an unintended byproduct of the injurer’s risky behavior. Reciprocity does not demand that the victim must respond in kind by aggressively taking an eye
from the injurer. By exacting compensation for the accidental harm, the vic-

28 . See id . at 1533–36.
29. RICHARD THURNWALD, ECONOMICS IN PRIMITIVE COMMUNITIES 106 (1932).
30. WILLIAM IAN MILLER, EYE FOR AN EYE 4 (2006).
31 . Id . at 24; see also Whitman, supra note 24, at 70–71 (“Some sort of vengeance system
very probably does lie in the background of the archaic sources. But in the dynamic of that system, it is likely that money compensation and talionic mutilation always co-existed.”).
32. HOLMES, supra note 26, at 5.
33. DAVID DAUBE, STUDIES IN BIBLICAL LAW 103 (1947). “An impartial analysis of the
sources suggests . . . that criminal law notions and civil law notions, the principle of punishment and that of compensation, are of equal age.” Id . at 102–03.
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tim would cause the injurer to suffer the same amount of loss—a reciprocal
act that would restore equitable balance. Compensation would also ensure
that the injurer did not benefit at the expense of the victim’s person or property, thereby deterring others from engaging in such risky conduct in the future: don’t expect to benefit at my expense. 34 For readily understandable
reasons, enforcement of the compensatory obligation in cases of accidental
harm enabled victims to maintain their honor. Within the biblical tradition,
an “eye for an eye” was interpreted to mean the value of an eye for an eye. 35
The reciprocity norm accordingly recognized two different remedies to
redress two normatively distinct types of mistreatment that victims suffered
at the hands of their injurers. An act of aggression directly attacked the victim’s body or property, whereas the failure to compensate in cases of accidental harm directly attacked the victim’s honor. The first type of mistreatmistreatment—to be called “culpable mistreatment”—required redress by
the remedy of retaliatory revenge, whereas the normatively different type of
“honor-based mistreatment” only required compensation to restore equitable balance.
These two types of mistreatment were then redressed by the early common law through its enforcement of the reciprocity norms governing revenge and compensation. A plaintiff was entitled to the appropriate form of
redress—punishment or compensation—that was tailored to the type of mistreatment inflicted by the defendant. “According to the lawyers [of this era],
victims who preferred vengeance over compensation prosecuted their
wrongdoers for crime. Victims who preferred compensation over vengeance
sued their wrongdoers for tort.” 36 By channeling these self-help remedies
from the state of nature into the legal system for civilized resolution by impartial decisionmakers, the early common law was fully structured by the
principle of civil recourse.
The early common law shows that the principle of civil recourse is not
inherently “tied to notions of retribution or vengeance,” as Goldberg and
Zipursky correctly emphasize (p. 65). In addition to providing victims with
the remedy of punishment as redress for culpable mistreatment, the early
common law also provided victims with compensation as redress for honorbased mistreatment. Goldberg and Zipursky, however, do not recognize the
different types of mistreatment. By exclusively discussing the intentional
harms of “batteries, false imprisonments, and trespasses to property” that
involved “serious forms of mistreatment” (p. 234), they largely define the early common law in terms of culpable mistreatment, thereby ignoring the
honor-based mistreatment that justified compensation as redress for accidental harms.

34. For more extensive discussion, see Geistfeld, supra note 27, at 1543–46.
35 . See DAUBE, supra note 33, at 102–07.
36. David J. Seipp, The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the Early Common Law,
76 B.U. L. REV. 59, 59–60 (1996).
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Unlike the portrayal drawn by Goldberg and Zipursky, the early common law continued to recognize the compensatory norm. “Throughout the
medieval and early modern periods there is a strong focus on the loss suffered by the plaintiff rather than on the wrongful conduct of the defendant:
‘If a man suffers damage it is right that he be compensated’. . . .” 37 A defendant who caused accidental harm only mistreated the plaintiff’s honor by not
compensating the injury, placing the focus on the uncompensated loss rather
than on the (nonculpable) injury-causing conduct. A focus on wrongful
conduct was only relevant in cases of culpable mistreatment that triggered
the normative concern for punishment.
The early common law enforced the compensatory norm (the value of
an eye for an eye) with the principle that “a man acts at his peril,” which
“seems” to have been “adopted by some of the greatest common-law authorities” according to Holmes. 38 In his famous critique of this principle, Holmes
showed that liability is limited to the injuries foreseeably caused by one’s
risky conduct. 39 Such a limitation is embedded in the relational responsibility entailed by the reciprocity norm of compensation. 40 The associated compensatory duty expresses the precept that one “shalt do no hurt to thy
neighbor,” confirming Pollock’s observation that that “[o]ur law of torts,
with all its irregularities, has for its main purpose nothing else than the development of this precept.” 41
Over time, the link between compensation and honor-based mistreatment fundamentally changed. In the state of nature, honor was essential for
survival; without it, one was vulnerable to attack. Consequently, for the first
form of compensatory tort liability—the writ of trespass—“[i]t is . . . possible
to identify from the early records two ideas at work: affronts to honour, and

37. D.J. IBBETSON, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 58
(1999) (quoting Hulle v. Orynge (The Case of Thorns) YB 6 Edw. 4, fol. 7a, Mich., pl. 18 (1466)
(Eng.)).
38. HOLMES, supra note 26, at 76; cf . 1 FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF TORTS OR
PRIVATE WRONGS 82 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1859) (“The liability to make reparation for
an injury is said to rest upon an original moral duty, enjoined upon every person, so to conduct
himself or exercise his own rights as not to injure another.”); Francis H. Bohlen, The Rule in
Rylands v. Fletcher (pt. 1), 59 U. PA. L. REV. 298, 309 (1911) (“There is every reason to believe
that the original conception was that legal liability for injury of all kinds depended not upon
the actor’s fault, but upon the fact that his act had directly caused harm to the plaintiff.”); Leon
Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401, 1412 (1961) (observing that
there was “a deep sense of early common law morality that one who hurts another should
compensate him”).
39. HOLMES, supra note 26, at 87–88.
40. In a case of nonfeasance or failure to rescue, the reciprocal response is one of nonfeasance or doing nothing. The requirement of foreseeable harm, in turn, sets apart the injurer
subject to the reciprocal response from the much larger class of individuals, including parents
of the injurer, whose affirmative acts were also causes of the injury. For more extensive discussion, see Geistfeld, supra note 27, at 1551–55.
41 . See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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the causation of loss.” 42 As centralized government became increasingly capable of protecting individuals from being harmed by others, the maintenance of one’s honor became less important for deterrence purposes.
Lacking a deterrence rationale, the concern for dishonor waned over time so
that “liability for wrongdoing was exclusively focused on the causation of
loss. This became the central feature of the action of trespass, and it has remained the central feature of the English law of tort.” 43 In cases of accidental
harm, the fact that one has caused another to suffer loss—and created the
concomitant need for compensation—now shapes the reciprocity norm of
equitable balance, leaving any deep-rooted concern about honor-based mistreatment in the distant past.
To defend their thesis that the main purpose of tort law is to implement
the principle of civil recourse as redress for prohibited forms of mistreatment, Goldberg and Zipursky claim that any purely compensatory form of
liability is “locate[d] . . . at or beyond tort law’s conceptual boundaries”
(p. 191). A compensatory norm, however, has formed the core of tort law
from the outset. It generates interpersonal obligations that are a form of civil
recourse, relying on compensation to attain equitable balance between rightholders and duty-bearers. Modern tort liability still satisfies the principle of
civil recourse as Goldberg and Zipursky maintain, but legal history belies
their claim that tort rules are still formulated to provide interpersonal redress for prohibited forms of mistreatment.
B. The Unity of Compensation and Deterrence
Since it originated in the state of nature, the reciprocity norm of compensation has always accounted for the value of deterrence—the manner in
which the compensatory obligation can induce duty-bearers to avoid injuring right-holders in the first instance. The compensatory norm unifies the
functions of injury compensation and deterrence in a manner that produces
different types of behavioral obligations. Having identified those obligations,
we can then pinpoint the importance of mistreatment within modern tort
law.
In general, “the concrete demands [of reciprocity] change substantially
from situation to situation and vary with the benefits which one party receives from another.” 44 Across the full range of social interactions governed
by tort law, variations in the mutuality of benefits and costs alter the concrete demands of reciprocity, justifying a diversity of liability rules.
For any given interaction, the mutuality of costs and benefits depends
on facts that are unique to that particular case. Compensatory obligations
tailored to such highly individuated circumstances cannot realistically gov-

42. IBBETSON, supra note 37, at 14.
43 . Id . at 17.
44. Alvin W. Gouldner, The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement, 25 AM.
SOCIO. REV. 161, 175 (1960).
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ern the risky behavior of individuals continually interacting with different
sets of strangers across the changing conditions characteristic of modern society. A behaviorally sound formulation of the norm must instead be defined
in an objective manner that can be readily understood by the interacting parties in a wide range of settings. An objective formulation of the norm yields
behavioral obligations fully corresponding to those enforced by the modern
tort rules governing accidental physical harms caused by noncriminal conduct outside of contractual relationships. 45
The reciprocity rationale for negligence liability is straightforward:
When engaged in activities creating risks no greater than the ordinary or
background level of risk in the community, individuals must make the same
decisions regarding the safety of others that they would make for their own
protection. This normative obligation to exercise reciprocal care toward oneself and others is embodied in the duty to exercise reasonable care. This tort
obligation is no different from the (ordinary) care that individuals take for
their own protection, a formulation expressed by some jury instructions 46
and substantively equivalent to the influential Hand formula for reasonable
care. 47 Courts have recognized that under these conditions, each individual
is compensated by the right that he or she has to impose such risks on others
without having to pay compensation for their injuries. 48
Once extended across the full range of risky interactions, the reciprocity
norm also justifies complementary rules of strict liability: When individuals
who exercise ordinary care are engaged in activities creating risks significantly above the ordinary or background level of risk in the community, they
must compensate others for their resultant injuries. A nonreciprocal risk
creates an imbalance between the parties, justifying a purely compensatory
obligation enforced by a rule of strict liability. But this compensation,
though valuable, cannot fully repair bodily injuries and other irreparable
harms. To offset the imperfect compensation afforded by the damages remedy, the risky actor must also exercise care above the ordinary amount in order to further reduce the risk of irreparable injury. This method for attaining
equitable balance is enforced by the rule of strict liability for abnormally

45. For more extensive analysis in support of these conclusions, see Geistfeld, supra
note 27, at 1571–82. The normative properties of contractual relationships are different for
reasons discussed in Section II.C below.
46 . E .g ., UJI 13-1603 NMRA (2020), https://nmonesource.com/nmos/nmra/en
/item/5680/index.do#!b/13-1603 [https://perma.cc/KHF7-TC5V] (“ ‘Ordinary care’ is that care
which a reasonably prudent person would use in the conduct of [that] person’s own affairs.”).
47. For conduct that threatens self-injury, individuals minimize their total costs by taking any precaution with a burden less than the associated reduction in their expected injury
costs—the same decision rule required by the Hand formula. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.) (“[I]f the probability [of injury] be called P;
the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by
P: i.e., whether B < PL .” (emphases added)).
48 . See, e .g ., Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 485 (1873).
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dangerous activities 49 and is consistent with the findings of empirical studies
seeking to identify how lay individuals determine the requirements of reasonable care. 50
Thus, for noncriminal risky interactions outside of contractual relationships, liability depends on the reciprocity of risk. Negligence liability involves one party who injured another with an objectively defined
nonreciprocal risk created by her unreasonably dangerous behavior, whereas
strict liability applies to injuries caused by an objectively defined nonreciprocal (abnormally dangerous) risk that existed despite the actor’s exercise of
reasonable care. Reciprocity, however, is only a behavioral norm that is enforced by the legal system for reasons of policy or principle. Based on these
reasons, tort law can justifiably limit liability for injuries caused by nonreciprocal risks. 51
Within a compensatory tort system, liability is not necessarily tied to
prohibited mistreatment, creating a clear-cut rationale for the forms of nofault or strict liability. By contrast, Goldberg and Zipursky contend that
these forms of liability are based on the defendant’s failure to comply with an
“unforgiving” behavioral obligation to not injure the plaintiff (p. 63).
A good example of such a rule is that “[a]n actor’s mental or emotional
disability is not considered in determining whether conduct is negligent.” 52
Though labeled as a rule of negligence liability, this obligation functions as a
form of no-fault or strict liability for an obvious reason: individuals with a
mental disability are not always capable of acting like a reasonable person
with ordinary mental capabilities. But even when individuals with mental
disabilities cannot satisfy this unrealistic behavioral demand, Goldberg and
Zipursky nevertheless claim that a defendant’s failure to do so mistreated the
plaintiff.
The rationale for liability instead is made clear by the behaviorally realistic requirements of reciprocity. If a mental disability prevents one from exercising the amount of care taken by those with ordinary capabilities, then the

49 . See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519(1) (AM. L. INST. 1977) (“One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm to the person, land or
chattels of another resulting from the activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm.” (emphasis added)). The failure to exercise “utmost care” would subject the defendant to negligence liability, so a duty-bearer who fully complies with the compensatory
obligation exercises utmost care and pays (under the rule of strict liability) for the injuries that
are nevertheless caused by the abnormally dangerous or nonreciprocal risk.
50. Geistfeld, supra note 27, at 1560–61, 1576 n.232 (describing studies finding that lay
individuals (jurors) and judges evaluate the standard of reasonable care for risky conduct
threatening bodily injury by requiring precautions in excess of the amount required by the
Hand formula). See generally Mark A. Geistfeld, Folk Tort Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
PRIVATE LAW THEORY 338 (Hanoch Dagan & Benjamin C. Zipursky eds., 2020) (providing
extensive empirical evidence supporting the conclusion that jurors rely on the reciprocity
norm for determining the requirements of reasonable care in negligence cases).
51 . See Geistfeld, supra note 27, at 1585–88.
52. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 11(c)
(AM. L. INST. 2010).
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risky actor has created an objectively defined nonreciprocal risk fairly governed by a rule of strict liability; personal fault or blameworthiness is irrelevant for compensatory purposes. The objectively defined negligence rule
contains other pockets of no-fault liability with this same property. 53
Mentally incapacitated individuals who are not institutionalized have
the same right as everyone else to participate in society. They must comply
with the same rules applicable to everyone else, but their inability to fully
comply with these objectively defined rules does not justify a prohibition of
that behavior—the normative message sent by Goldberg and Zipursky’s
formulation of the tort duty. 54 A compensatory duty normatively differs
from conduct-based, prohibitory duties of noninjury.
Consistent with this reasoning, tort law prohibits behavior in only a subset of cases, not in all cases as Goldberg and Zipursky maintain. Conductbased tort duties can be quite “unforgiving” as they put it, so the mere breach
of the duty to exercise reasonable care does not necessarily mistreat the
plaintiff (as in the aforementioned cases involving defendants with mental
incapacities). Instead, a defendant mistreats the plaintiff by reprehensibly
disregarding or rejecting the obligation to exercise reasonable care. Tort law
prohibits this type of behavior and enforces the prohibition with the remedy
of punitive damages.
A defendant can be subject to punitive damages for engaging in “morally
culpable conduct” that “shows flagrant indifference to the safety or rights of
others.” 55 Such conduct culpably mistreats the plaintiff for reasons inherent
in the ordinary damages remedy.
Compensatory damages do not fully repair bodily injuries and even
damage to important forms of personal property. These physical harms are
“irreparable injur[ies], and for centuries the common law has recognized
that the prevention of such an injury is better than compensation via the
damages remedy.” 56 Consequently, a duty-bearer does not have the option of
paying compensatory damages instead of attempting to exercise reasonable
care—and thereby prevent injury—in the first instance. 57 Having reprehensibly disregarded or rejected the duty and the plaintiff’s associated tort right,
a defendant responsible for an irreparable injury does not fully satisfy her
tort obligation by paying compensatory damages. The defendant’s culpable

53. MARK A. GEISTFELD, TORT LAW: THE ESSENTIALS 180–91 (2008) (showing why duty-bearers who are unable to comply with the objectively defined standard of reasonable care
are subject to no-fault or strict liability for nonreciprocal risks).
54 . See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.
55. 3 DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 483
(2d ed. 2011).
56. Mark A. Geistfeld, The Principle of Misalignment: Duty, Damages, and the Nature of
Tort Liability, 121 YALE L.J. 142, 158, 159–65 (2011).
57 . Id . at 165–69.
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mistreatment of the plaintiff merits a punitive response through an award of
extracompensatory damages that fully vindicates the plaintiff’s right. 58
Culpable mistreatment still merits redress within the modern tort system, but only through an award of punitive damages. 59 Punitive damages are
exceptional, however, because the ordinary case of accidental harm does not
involve either culpable mistreatment or honor-based mistreatment. Without
any reason for redressing mistreatment, the tort rules governing accidental
harms protect the tort right solely through the functions of deterrence and
injury compensation. Mistreatment is only relevant to the remedial aspects
of modern tort law for reasons confirmed by the rules governing productcaused injuries.
C. The Example of Strict Products Liability
Manufacturers and other product sellers are subject to strict liability
when their products contain defects that cause physical harm to consumers. 60 This rule further illustrates the substantive differences between a compensatory tort right and the conduct-based, prohibitory duties of noninjury
posited by Goldberg and Zipursky. On their account:
Like the directives in trespass, negligence, and other torts, this directive—
“Do not cause injury to a consumer by sending into commerce a dangerously defective product”—sets a standard of conduct that is unforgiving. It
can be violated even if a seller takes “all possible care” to prevent a defective
product from entering commerce. 61

Having defined strict products liability as a form of interpersonal redress
for prohibited mistreatment that applies even to “conscientious and diligent
actions” (p. 193), Goldberg and Zipursky conclude that the “instrumental
rationales emphasizing loss-spreading, compensation, and deterrence” only
“support” this rule of tort law and are “distinct from the rule itself” (p. 195).
When strict products liability is derived from a compensatory tort right,
the substantive nature of the liability rule is cast in a very different form. The
concerns for compensation and deterrence do not “support” the rule; they
instead fully shape its substantive content, providing another example of
how the prevention and redress of injury are integrated in the manner that
Goldberg and Zipursky otherwise seek to attain with their interpretive theory of “dual constructivism” (pp. 238–39).

58 . See generally Mark A. Geistfeld, Punitive Damages, Retribution, and Due Process, 81
S. CAL. L. REV. 263 (2008) (demonstrating how punitive damages can be formulated in manner
that punishes a defendant for having reprehensibly violated the plaintiff’s compensatory tort
right).
59 . See supra text following note 35 (describing how the early common law provided a
punitive remedy for the victims of culpable mistreatment).
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. L. INST. 1965).
61. P. 193 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A).
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Unlike ordinary tort cases such as those involving drivers and pedestrians, product cases are situated within a contractual context that inherently
affects the distributive properties of the liability rules. 62 For the equilibrium
in a market governed by tort rights and their correlative obligations, the
manufacturer is entitled “to generate a sustained profit, above the cost of doing business.” 63 The manufacturer’s tort obligations—the required safety investments and compensation for product-caused injuries—factor into the
manufacturer’s cost of doing business and result in either higher product
prices or decreased product functionality. Hence the costs of the manufacturer’s tort obligations are fully borne by consumers. 64 Leaving aside cases of
bystander injuries, the liability rule only affects consumer interests, justifying
a tort duty limited to the protection of consumer expectations regarding safe
product performance—the duty embodied in the rule of strict products liability. 65
The ordinary consumer reasonably expects manufacturers to invest in
product safety only if the benefit of risk reduction (fully accruing to consumers) exceeds the cost of the safety investment (also fully borne by consumers
via higher prices and the like). 66 The efficient liability rule, which maximizes
the net benefit that the ordinary consumer reasonably expects to derive from
product use, fully satisfies the compensatory demands of the ordinary consumer.
This liability rule integrates the functions of compensation and deterrence or injury prevention. In market contexts, injury compensation is a
form of loss spreading or insurance, because the costs of the manufacturer’s
compensatory liability are impounded in product prices and spread among
62. For more extensive analysis of the issues addressed in the following discussion, see
MARK A. GEISTFELD, PRINCIPLES OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 39–63 (3d ed. 2020). Much of the
ensuing discussion in this Section is drawn from this book.
63. Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328, 385 (Pa. 2014).
64. Costs and benefits cannot be determined until the associated legal entitlements have
first been specified; that baseline then determines how a tort rule distributes costs and benefits
among duty-bearers and right-holders. See Mark A. Geistfeld, The Tort Entitlement to Physical
Security as the Distributive Basis for Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulations, 15
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 387, 392–98 (2014). For the market equilibrium that obtains at the
normatively appropriate baseline, the manufacturer must cover all of its costs, including liability costs. Consequently, the price that consumers pay for the product covers the full costs of
manufacturer tort liability.
65. Sellers are strictly liable for products that are both defective and “unreasonably dangerous.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A. To satisfy the latter requirement, the
product “must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the
ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community
as to its characteristics.” Id . cmt. i. Once situated within the entire claim, the “unreasonably
dangerous” requirement determines whether the tort duty justifiably displaces contract law in
order to protect uninformed consumers from unexpected product risks, with the defect then
breaching that duty when it proximately causes physical harm. See GEISTFELD, supra note 62, at
45–52. As this formulation suggests, cases of bystander injuries require a different formulation
of the duty based on the ordinary negligence principle. See id . at 349–62.
66 . See GEISTFELD, supra note 62, at 39, 56.
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all consumers. Injury compensation supplied by the tort system is substantially more expensive than other insurance mechanisms (consider legal fees
alone). Consequently, consumers expect that manufacturers will incur liability only when doing so creates the necessary financial incentives for them to
supply reasonably safe products. 67 The ordinary consumer’s expectations of
compensation are completely determined by the value of deterrence, which
is why liability rules that protect consumer expectations of safe product performance inherently unify these two attributes of tort liability.
By directly unifying compensation and deterrence within the reasonable
expectations of consumers, this form of analysis is considerably more incisive than the arguments by Goldberg and Zipursky that attempt to unify
these two properties with a conduct-based formulation of strict products liability that purportedly prohibits certain forms of mistreatment. 68 To be sure,
they are correct that compensation and deterrence are “distinct” from the
conduct formally required by the rule of strict products liability (p. 195). But
the condition of the product as required by tort duty is wholly shaped by
consumer expectations of safe product performance, not by an independent
concern about mistreatment. 69
The same is true for remedies, including punitive damages. 70 Aside from
the impact on compensation and deterrence, what is the point of giving consumers redress for mistreatment by manufacturers when the liability costs
are ultimately borne by consumers in the form of higher prices and the like?
Courts effectively recognize as much: “Strict products liability, unlike
negligence doctrine, focuses on the nature of the product, and not the nature
of the manufacturer’s conduct.” 71 Whether the manufacturer’s conduct mistreated the consumer is not substantively relevant for strict products liability,
even though these liability rules formally satisfy Goldberg and Zipursky’s
definition of mistreatment as the violation of an “unforgiving” standard of
behavior.

67 . See GEISTFELD, supra note 62, at 65–72.
68. For example, this analysis shows why consumers reasonably expect product designs
to pass the risk-utility test. Id . at 40, 52–57. By contrast, Goldberg and Zipursky interpret the
risk-utility test largely in terms of the negligence concept of faulty behavior that otherwise has
no necessary connection to consumer expectations. Pp. 310–11. Once the risk-utility test is
wholly unmoored from consumer expectations, jurors will routinely misapply the test by requiring excessively costly investments in product safety. See GEISTFELD, supra note 62, at 123–
26.
69 . See generally GEISTFELD, supra note 62 (showing how the important doctrines of
strict products liability can all be derived from consumer expectations about product safety
and compensation of product-caused injury).
70 . See id . at 285–312.
71. Kim v. Toyota Motor Corp., 424 P.3d 290, 298 (Cal. 2018) (citing Barker v. Lull
Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 457 (Cal. 1978)).
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III. RECOGNIZING RIGHTS
Civil recourse is an historical fact rooted in the early common law, explaining why the bill of rights in state constitutions across the country typically require that individuals either “shall” or “ought” to have a remedy “for
an injury done him in his person” or “property.” 72 The right can be adequately protected, however, even if the scope of tort liability is considerably
reduced. With the rise of the administrative state, tort liability no longer
necessarily serves the vital role it once did, which is why legislative limitations of tort liability are not necessarily unconstitutional. These developments do not make tort law any less valuable. The primary purpose of
modern tort law is to recognize the rights that should be protected by either
tort liability or alternative modes of legal regulation—a purpose far removed
from the early common law’s imposition of liability for prohibited forms of
mistreatment, a concern that is largely irrelevant in contemporary society.
A. The Limited Importance of Civil Recourse for Modern Tort Law
As Goldberg and Zipursky acknowledge, “civil recourse theory informs
but does not determine the content of tort law” (p. 234). To support their
thesis that the primary purpose of tort law is to implement the principle of
civil recourse, Goldberg and Zipursky require a conception of substantive
tort law that powerfully connects to civil recourse.
Reconsider their interpretation of tort law in this light. “In our parlance,
‘redress’ refers to a special case of civil recourse. It is the fulfillment—
recognition—of a legitimate demand by an injury victim for responsive action from a wrongful injurer” (p. 17). Their account specifies only one version of civil recourse, a “special case” that gives pronounced importance to
the compensation of victims by those who have wrongfully mistreated them.
The linchpin of their argument, therefore, is based on the distinctive properties of interpersonal redress for prohibited mistreatment, not on the properties required by civil recourse. Recognizing as much, Goldberg and Zipursky
helpfully explain that the label “civil recourse theory” is “potentially misleading. Ours is a redress-for-wrongs (or wrongs-and-redress) theory” (p. 263).
Having defined substantive tort law with a redress-for-wrongs theory
that clearly calls for interpersonal remedies, Goldberg and Zipursky then
conclude that the primary purpose of tort law is to implement the principle
of civil recourse. Everything else is secondary.
On our view, the primary point of supplying rights of action to those who
have been wronged is not to facilitate the public vindication of the plaintiff’s standing as a rights-bearer, or to promote public deliberation over our
moral responsibilities, or to ensure that injustices are rectified. Instead, it is
to provide certain legal powers to victims as against tortfeasors. (p. 277)

72 .

See supra notes 7–10 and accompanying text.
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Goldberg and Zipursky recognize that tort law can be supported by other reasons. “The doing of justice—like deterrence and compensation—is
something that tort law can sometimes deliver. But this is quite different
from saying tort law is a system for the doing of justice. It is not” (p. 357).
Tort law basically delivers civil recourse, full stop.
These claims are overblown. Like any other body of law, tort law is constrained by the requirements of equality and justice. 73 By definition, a constraint does not define the objective that one is trying to attain; it only places
limits on how one can achieve that objective. Even if the primary purpose of
tort liability is to provide injury victims with civil recourse, this form of governmental coercion must still be just and treat everyone—both right-holders
and duty-bearers—equally. Tort liability must be delivered by a system that
“does justice,” even if doing so is not its primary purpose.
A compensatory tort right satisfies these requirements. 74 This conception of substantive tort law also shows why liability is not tethered to redress
for prohibited forms of injury-causing behavior, the type of mistreatment
required by Goldberg and Zipursky.
A tort right is defined by the legal protection it provides to certain interests of the right-holder, such as the interest in physical security. 75 For reasons provided in Part II, a compensatory right to physical security generates
the rules of negligence, strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities,
and strict products liability. Each type of rule embodies the compensatory
obligation translated into the amount of care (deterrence) and injury compensation that fairly protect the right-holder’s interest in physical security,
which is not the same as prohibiting a duty-bearer from mistreating the
right-holder. For purposes of the tort right to physical security, mistreatment
only matters to the extent that it threatens the right-holder’s legally protected interest in physical security.
In the state of nature, injury-causing behavior always mistreated the victim’s honor and consequently threatened his interest in physical security,
explaining why the right to physical security within the early common law
can be accurately characterized as a right to be free from mistreatment—the
type of right required by Goldberg and Zipursky. 76 In modern society, the
loss of honor is not invariably tied to one’s interest in physical security. To
be relevant, the mistreatment in cases of physical harm must be culpable,
which considerably diminishes the importance of civil recourse for modern
tort law.

73 . See RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
EQUALITY 1 (2000) (“No government is legitimate that does not show equal concern for the
fate of all those citizens over whom it claims dominion and from whom it claims allegiance.”).
74 . See Mark A. Geistfeld, Compensation as a Tort Norm, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS 65, 66 (John Oberdiek ed., 2014).
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 1965).
76 . See HOLMES, supra note 26.
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As previously discussed, culpable mistreatment threatens a rightholder’s interest in physical security because compensatory damages do not
fully repair bodily injuries and other physical harms. 77 The modern tort right
to physical security accordingly empowers plaintiffs to seek extracompensatory or punitive damages to adequately remedy reprehensible rights violations, regardless of whether the defendant is otherwise subject to
punishment under the criminal law. In these cases, tort law provides a distinctive form of interpersonal redress for mistreatment that can be attained
only through tort liability. But outside of these exceptional cases, the manner
in which tort law protects the right to physical security turns on issues of
compensation and deterrence, the analysis of which is not helpfully advanced by a focus on prohibited mistreatment and the related emphasis on
civil recourse.
This point is underscored by the role of liability insurance. To accommodate this practice within their theory, Goldberg and Zipursky basically
rely on the argument that “if a person owes a duty to another, it
is . . . possible for her to make a contractual arrangement with a third party
to assist her in fulfilling the duty” (p. 274). This argument is puzzling. Liability, on their account, always involves prohibited mistreatment that merits
the interpersonal remedy of redress. Why does the plaintiff’s power to seek
interpersonal redress for prohibited mistreatment result in a form of liability
that the defendant can fairly satisfy with an insurance contract that shifts the
obligation onto a third party? The interpersonal remedy of apology cannot be
satisfied by liability insurance, nor can the criminal penalties that apply to
legally prohibited behaviors. Why is the interpersonal civil redress for prohibited mistreatment fundamentally different? Liability insurance substantially influences the practice of modern tort law, 78 yet it fits awkwardly—at
best—within a tort system designed to deliver interpersonal redress for prohibited forms of mistreatment.
Once mistreatment is eliminated as a necessary condition for tort liability, the role of liability insurance can be justified. To protect the individual
right to physical security, modern tort law focuses on the compensation and
prevention of injury, each of which is affected by liability insurance. A dutybearer who purchases liability insurance facilitates compensation by creating
an asset for satisfying a tort judgment, but she will also have reduced financial incentives for avoiding injuries covered by the policy (moral hazard).
The benefits of coverage obviously extend to right-holders, who also incur
the costs of moral hazard by facing the increased risk of injury. Liability insurance is structured in a manner that provides the maximum amount of
coverage with limitations designed to combat moral hazard in a cost-

77 . See supra text accompanying notes 55–56.
78 . See generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND
TORT LAW FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11 (2008) (describing the symbiotic relationship
between the growth of tort liability and the development of liability insurance).
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effective manner. 79 By ensuring that the benefits of coverage exceed the costs
of moral hazard, liability insurance confers a net benefit on right-holders
and justifiably satisfies the associated tort obligations.
Matters are normatively different when a defendant reprehensibly disregarded or rejected the obligation to exercise reasonable care, a difference
recognized by courts in deciding whether to enforce insurance policies covering liabilities for punitive damages. 80 This type of culpable mistreatment
triggers the concern for interpersonal redress that can rule out liability insurance, which otherwise is a normatively sound arrangement for defendants to satisfy the compensatory obligations they owe to plaintiffs for their
injuries.
Outside of the punitive-damages remedy, the modern tort rules governing accidental physical harms are not substantively determined by the normative properties of interpersonal redress for prohibited mistreatment.
These rules still satisfy the requirements of civil recourse—they empower injury victims to receive compensation from their injurers. The redressive
structure of liability is undoubtedly valuable, but the primary rationale for
modern tort law resides in the reasons that shape the substantive content of
the liability rules, not in the remedial structure of those rules.
B. The Value of Tort Liability and the Value of Tort Law
A right that protects individuals from physical harm does not necessarily
require tort liability. Injury compensation can be provided by insurance
mechanisms; deterrence, by regulatory agencies and the criminal law. In a
world without tort liability, individuals could still be adequately protected
from physical harm, even though they would have no right to civil recourse
against their injurers.
As Goldberg and Zipursky correctly point out, this “publicenforcement” option will not ensure perfect compliance, and the ensuing
concentration of government power could easily result in the unequal treatment of citizens (pp. 132–33). They are also on solid ground in arguing that,
unlike administrative regulation, the process of common-law adjudication
“helps keep the law in touch with social norms and positive morality”
(p. 344). Though valid, these points only show that tort liability has certain
comparative institutional advantages over regulatory alternatives. The comparative institutional advantages of tort liability do not make the tort system
an essential component of a just liberal democracy, unlike the right to vote.
By contrast to the wrongs redressed by tort liability, the rights recognized by tort law are more essential. Unlike medieval times, when the common law provided the primary way to protect individuals from physical
79 . See Mark A. Geistfeld, Interpreting the Rules of Insurance Contract Interpretation, 68
RUTGERS U. L. REV. 371, 383–87 (2015).
80 . See generally Catherine M. Sharkey, Revisiting the Noninsurable Costs of Accidents,
64 MD. L. REV. 409 (2005) (describing the disagreement among courts as to whether liability
insurance for punitive damages is enforceable as a matter of public policy).
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harm, different departments of law now protect the health and safety of citizens. 81 From the individual’s perspective, the extent to which the law protects against physical harm depends on how the government regulates risky
behavior in its entirety. Even if tort law ensured that individuals were adequately safe while traveling on the highway, their overall security would be
unduly threatened if environmental regulations did not adequately ensure
the purity of the water they drink at home. What is adequate for this purpose
depends on the underlying safety norm that determines the protection to
which individuals are entitled—the very same issue addressed by the substantive rights recognized by tort law.
For reasons of history and federalism, the individual right to physical security can be derived from the common law of torts. 82 Tort law enforces
safety obligations that fairly mediate conflicts between the right-holder’s interest in physical security and the duty-bearer’s interest in liberty. The manner in which tort law mediates these conflicting interests provides adequate
guidance for the formulation of federal regulatory standards. For example,
federal regulations governing autonomous vehicles will adequately protect
individuals from harm while optimally solving the federalism problem when
based on the safety performance required by the widely adopted rule of strict
products liability. 83 More generally, regulatory reliance on the substantive
content of the tort right promotes consistency across different bodies of law
and makes it possible to answer the hard distributive questions involved in
the promulgation of any health-and-safety regulatory standard, including
those based on cost-benefit analysis. 84
The individual entitlement to physical security was first recognized by
the common law in a world quite different from our own. Although other
legal institutions can now protect this right, it has significance that extends
far beyond the imposition of liability through the tort system. This entitlement shows why the primary purpose of tort law involves the recognition of
individual rights, not the imposition of liability.
CONCLUSION
As indicated by the title of their book, Goldberg and Zipursky maintain
that “[t]ort law is all about recognizing wrongs” (p. 350). Tort law, on their
account, limits liability to the interpersonal redress for prohibited forms of
mistreatment, leading them to conclude that the primary purpose of tort law
is to implement the principle of civil recourse. To defend their thesis, Gold-

81 . See generally Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN.
L. REV. 1189 (1986) (describing the development of regulatory institutions over time).
82 . See Geistfeld, supra note 64, at 389–91.
83 . See generally Mark A. Geistfeld, The Regulatory Sweet Spot for Autonomous Vehicles,
53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 337 (2018) (explaining why this type of federal regulatory standard
optimally solves the federalism problem of ensuring national uniformity while respecting the
state interest in tort rules that protect individuals from product-caused harms).
84 . See Geistfeld, supra note 64, at 408–14.
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berg and Zipursky invoke an antiquated rationale for tort liability that is no
longer relevant to the modern tort system.
The early common law inherited a world in which mistreatment, honor,
and physical security were all entwined, generating a reciprocity norm that
used compensation to redress the mistreatment or loss of honor that necessarily occurred when one individual accidentally injured another. Modern
tort law governs fundamentally different social conditions. Instead of depending on one’s honor, physical security now largely depends on the prevention and compensation of injury, limiting the relevance of mistreatment
to egregious forms of culpable misconduct. Courts have accounted for these
changed conditions. Relying on common-law reasoning, they have used the
reciprocity norm of compensation to derive modern tort rights and their
correlative obligations in a manner that unifies the functions of compensation and deterrence, 85 a dynamic largely consistent with Goldberg and
Zipursky’s “fresh attempt” to interpret the development of tort law in this
manner (p. 213). Although mistreatment once had the prominence ascribed
to it by Goldberg and Zipursky, that concern is now largely irrelevant in
most cases of accidental physical harm, contrary to their characterization of
modern tort law.
The substantive content of tort law determines the importance of civil
recourse, not the other way around. Tort liability continues to satisfy the
formal requirements of civil recourse, but that principle does not provide the
primary reason for having the modern tort system. The book’s thesis founders by conflating tort liability—how wrongs are redressed—with tort law—
the specification of tort rights and their correlative obligations. Instead of
recognizing wrongs, the modern tort system is all about recognizing rights, a
core property not captured by this provocative book.

85 . See generally Mark A. Geistfeld, The Coherence of Compensation-Deterrence Theory
in Tort Law, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 383 (2012) (discussing the importance of unifying compensation and deterrence within a theory of tort law and demonstrating how a compensatory tort
right attains that unity).

